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ABSTRACT: Mullā Ṣadrā’s (c 1571-1640) commentary on Uṣūl al-
Kāfī is one of the more famous commentaries on this signiicant 
Shi‘i hadith collection. For his philosophical and Sui background, 
Ṣadrā’s approach to the hadith is slightly different and in some ways 
contrary to the earlier commentators such as`Allāma Majlisī in 
Shi‘aand Ibn Taymīyya in Sunni Islam. This paper aims to shed light 
on the way Ṣadrā interprets al-Kāfī and particularly to determine his 
understanding of the ʿaql (intellect) at the cosmic (as irst created-
being) and human levels as presented in the Kitāb al-ʿAql wa al-Jahl 
(The Book of Intellect and Ignorance). Ṣadrā, already well-versed in the 
philosophical discourses on ontology and cosmology, inds al-Kāfī 
as a fertile ground to develop and extend his vision of cosmos and 
existence. This paper, furthermore, investigates and reviews some 
later and contemporary scholars’ critiques of Ṣadrā’s view on hadith 
and intellect.
KEYWORDS: Islamic philosophy, intellect, Ṣadrā, al-Kafī, ʿaql, 
cosmology, ontology, Majlisi, Goldziher, Ibn Taymīyah
Introduction 
Scholarship in Islamic philosophy over the past ifty years has brought to 
light a number of important thinkers and texts in what is known as the 
post-Avicennian period of Islamic thought. Among these later igures, 
none is as important in the Islamic intellectual tradition as Mullā Ṣadrā 
Shirāzī (c 1571-1640), a major philosopher of the Ṣafavīd period whose 
work changed the course of Islamic philosophy and whose inluence 
continues to be felt to the present day. As has been observed by a number 
of scholars of Islamic philosophy, a relatively unexplored aspect of Ṣadrā’s 
corpus are his works in the religious sciences, as opposed to his writings 
in philosophy for which he is better known. In the religious sciences, 
Ṣadrā wrote a number of important commentaries upon the Qur’an with 
philosophical and mystical approaches, and also dedicated his attention 
to the traditions of the Prophet and the Shi‘a Imams. This latter aspect 
of his religious writings has received little attention in modern Western 
scholarship (the exceptions being Crow 1996, Rustom 2007-2013, Dakake 
2010). Among Ṣadrā’s writings on hadith, his monumental, incomplete 
commentary on the main book of Shi‘a hadith, Uṣūl al-Kāfī by al-Kulaynī 
(d. 970) is the single most important work. This magisterial work, in four 
hefty volumes in modern print, offers a detailed exposition of the irst 
two sections of al- Kulaynī’s hadith text which deals with the nature of 
the intellect and knowledge. 
This study investigates Ṣadrā’s approach in evaluating the reality of 
ʿaql (intellect) in his commentary on the opening chapter of Uṣūl al-Kāfī, 
where he proposes an Islamized version of cosmology and ontology of 
ʿaql. Considering the fact that his opponents were always denouncing 
intellectual encounters with religion, our aim is also to appraise the 
outcomes of such a philosophical and Sui approach. This becomes more 
important as other commentators of Shia hadith such as Muhammad 
Bāqir Majlisī (d.1698), a proliic Shi‘a hadith authority, directly attacked 
philosophical and intellectual interpretations of hadith and revelation 
for its implicit denial of religious creeds.
Ṣadrā, as he appears in his works, portrays himself as advocate of 
the intellectual approach to revelation in which the tradition of hikmah 
and philosophy play a vital role. In Islamic revelation, hikmah is what the 
Qur’an places next to the revelation:
 it is He who has sent amongst the unlettered a messenger from 
among themselves, to rehearse to them his signs, to sanctify 
them, and to instruct them in scripture and wisdom, - although 
they had been, before, in manifest error (62: 2).  
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In the history of Islamic thought, deining ʿaql 1 and determining its 
intervention in interpreting revelation has always been the subject of 
involute discussions. One cannot deine the ʿaql except by the ʿaql. The 
deinition of ʿaql by Muslim philosophers like al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā 
and consequently theologians mainly tends to describe its functions and 
cosmological or ontological levels. 
Muslim scholars had diverse views on the deinition and function 
of ʿ aql, its role in interpreting the Scripture, and its canonical importance 
in faith. The literal meaning of ʿaql in Arabic is “to restrain,” and its 
basic function is “to restrain man from precipitous conduct.” Within 
the context of the both transmitted (naqlī) and intellectual (ʿaqlī) Islamic 
sciences, there are various purposes and deinitions for ʿaql that range 
from various levels of the human faculty of thinking to an immaterial 
substance which is directly emanated from God and therefore called the 
irst created being. 
Nevertheless, if Qur’an is the main source for Islamic thought, even 
though the word ʿaql as a noun is not employed in that text, one cannot 
deny the book’s continual call to think, contemplate, and speculate. 
Verses such as “If we had only lent our ears or applied our reason we 
would not be now among the inhabitants of the hellire” (67:10) or 
“Surely the worst of beasts in God’s sight are those that are deaf and 
dumb and do not understand” (8:22) clearly emphasise the role of ʿaql 
in salvation. Moreover, the Qur’an uses cognate and associate terms to 
point to the importance of human intellection. In another phrase it 
interrogates [man?] as follows: “Do you not apply your reason”? (2:44) 
Hadith collections are the next sources on the nature of ʿaql in 
Islam. One can especially note those of Shi‘a Islam in which the subject 
of the very irst chapters begin with intellect and ignorance (kitāb al-ʿaql 
wa l-jahl).  In this regard, Uṣūl al-Kāfī 2, compiled by Abu Jaʿfar al-Kulaynī 
(d. 941), is one of the four authentic and irst of the four collections 
of hadith among the Shi‘a, which are equivalent to the six collections 
of Sunni Islam known as the Sihāh Sitta (The Six Authentic Books of 
Hadith).
Uṣūl al-Kāfī is divided into three parts in which the former deals with 
the principles (uṣūl) of faith and the second part contains the religious 
applications (furūʿ) while the third includes various aspects of religion 
and sayings or letters of the Shi‘a Imams. There has been a tradition 
of commenting on Uṣūl al-Kāfī. Shi‘a scholars, whether jurists (fuqahā), 
theologians (mutikallimūn), or philosophers have commented on the 
book based on their diverse standpoints. 
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This paper will examine the cosmological and ontological status 
and functions of ʿaql according to Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentary on Uṣūl al-
Kāfī which is mainly based on his discussions in the opening narrations 
of the irst chapter. 
Chronology of Commentaries on al-Uṣūl al-Kāfī
Shi‘a scholars usually commented on hadith collections. Yet, not all had 
similar approaches in their methodology and interpretation. Depending 
on the tendencies of the author, commentaries have been strongly 
inluenced by theological, philosophical or mystical forms. Muhammad 
Bāqir Mīr Dāmād (d. 1630) annotated some parts of al-Kāfī known as 
“al-Rawāshīh al-Samāwīyya.”3 In his introduction Mīr Dāmād asserts 
that since its compilation (seven hundred years earlier) there has not 
been a commentary to al-Kāfī to explain its dificulties and ambiguities 
(Mīr Dāmād, 2010, p. 4). This statement shows that according to the 
knowledge of Mīr Dāmād there has been no commentary on al-Kāfī since 
his time. Later scholarly works on the history of commentary of Usūl al-
Kāfī (ʿAbidī Shāhrūdī, 1383 A.H. Solar, pp. 113-114) shed light on the fact 
that until the irst half of the seventeenth century six other commentaries 
on Uṣūl al-Kāfī had been written and since then up to the present there 
have been more than 20 commentaries 4.
There are some other contemporary commentaries on Uṣūl al-
Kāfī with diverse approaches, among them, Sharh Uṣūl al-Kāfī (Ḥā’irī 
Yazdī, 2013) which includes a commentary on the chapters on intellect 
and ignorance and the Unity of God by Mahdī Ḥā’irī Yazdī is worth 
mentioning. 
Deinitions of ʿaql according to Ṣadrā’s Sharh-e Uṣūl al-Kāfī
In his commentary on Uṣūl al-Kāfī, following the third hadith of the 
irst chapter, Ṣadrā categorizes six levels of ʿaql deinitions (Shirazi, 1383 
Solar, pp. 223-4). He points out that the concept of ʿaql in some cases is 
equivocal and among some others is an analogical term. We summarise 
those deinitions as follows: 
A. Intellect is an innate disposition (gharīza) by which human is 
distinguished from other animals. All human kinds have this 
intellect which is a theoretical intellect, by means of which mankind 
is able to know the primary self-evidences (al-Badīhīyāt) and 
consequently the theoretical sciences. 
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B.  The second meaning of ʿ aql is that which theologians (mutakallimūn) 
apply; the goal of this ʿaql is afirmation or negation. The 
mutakallimūn’s purpose of approaching the ʿaql is its fundamental 
level, which is known to all. For instance, ʿaql in this meaning is the 
ability to understand that the whole is bigger than its part. 
C. The third deinition is the one that is referred to in the science of 
ethics (ʿUlūm al-Akhlāq). This intellect is a part of the human soul 
that is gradually attained by practising religious beliefs. By means of 
this intellect, one will be able to learn what good deeds to practice 
and what to avoid. 
D. Based on the fourth deinition, ʿaql is the faculty by which people 
call someone ʿāqeel (wise). If someone possesses this, he/she will be 
able to immediately recognise what to choose or withdraw. Ṣadrā 
indicates that people of truth (Ahl al-Ḥaqq) call this ability al-Nukrā 
or mischief not ʿaql. 
E. The ifth deinition of ʿaql is the one mentioned in the Kitāb al-Nafs 
(the Book on the Soul) that is divided into four categories: potential 
intellect, habitual intellect, actual intellect and intellectus in actus. 
F. The last deinition is the intellect discussed in the book of Ilāhīyyāt 
(Divinity) and refers to the knowledge of God. This is an entity 
that has no attachment or connection to anything but his creator, 
who is the self-abiding God. This sense of intellect applies to an 
external and objective being (immaterial substance) while the former 
deinitions were part of the human soul or its faculties (Sadra, 1383 
A.H, pp. 223-4). In other words, it is an essential-substance (jawhar) 
independent of bodies in every respect, not existent in the manner 
of contingent-accidents, nor acting and freely disposing in the 
manner of Souls-Psyches, nor as particularity and mixture as Matter 
and Form (Crow, 1996, p. 572).
Ontology and Cosmology
Ontology in philosophical discussions refers to the subject of existence. 
It questions the nature of being and constitutes a major branch of 
metaphysics. Cosmology, on the other hand, is the study of the origins 
and fate of the universe. In the Islamic intellectual tradition, cosmology 
includes the domains of both the appearance and disappearance of the 
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universe (Chittick, 2007); in religious terms, this means both the visible 
(shahādah) and invisible (ghayb) worlds. To put it another way, cosmology 
investigates both the origin (al-Mabda’) and the return (al-Maʿād) of the 
existence. 
For the Islamic intellectual tradition, the universe as a whole is a 
single being and, as Ṣadrā deines it, a single being has a particular type of 
gradation (tashkīk). In this order, what is nearer to the origin is simpler, 
and more spiritual, and what is distant is more compound and corporeal. 
For traditional Muslim thinkers, human beings had a role of utmost 
importance to play in the universe or circle of existence. They referred 
to the human as a microcosm (al-ʿalam al-saghīr) which was a mirror of 
the whole universe that in its turn was called a macrocosm (al-ʿalam al-
kabīr). Both man and universe according to Islamic intellectual tradition 
have a mutual relationship and movement. The beginning of creation 
marks the ‘centrifugal movement away from the Source,’ followed by 
the ‘centripetal movement toward the Source’ (Chittick, 2007, pp. 31-32). 
These are what the Islamic philosophical and Sui traditions commonly 
described as al-mabdaʾ wa al-maʿād, the Origin and the Return, or what 
in the school of Ibn ʿArabī marked as the descending and the ascending 
arcs of existence.  
For the vital role that the perfect man had in leading the ascending 
arc toward the origin, knowing the universe has never been separated 
from knowing the self. The philosophical and mystical views on 
existence were such that there was no duality between self and cosmos. 
Their origination from the One was a reason to see all as a sign and 
manifestation of the One and therefore to understand their ontological 
and cosmological signiicance. The upward and returning movement is 
discussed in terms of ontology and psychology, whereas the downward 
and originating movement is discussed in terms of cosmology. (Chittick, 
2012, p. 268)
Ṣadrā’s approach to Hadith
Before turning to Ṣadrā’s commentary and evaluation of the ʿaql, it is 
necessary to explain his methodology in dealing with hadith. When 
Ṣadrā encounters Scripture and hadith he has a major principle in mind 
which is emphasising the existence of some potential meaning in the core 
of those texts. In his introduction to Sharh al-Usūl al-Kāfī, Ṣadrā, while 
alluding to this point, states that: 
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I thought to begin the hadith commentary while asking God 
to protect me from any evil to be able to bring out those 
meanings from potentiality to actuality, highlighting them 
from secrecy to existence (Shīrāzī, 2005, p. 168). 
Thus, Ṣadrā’s approach is different from the commonly-held view of his 
opponents in grasping the in-depth meaning of narrations or revelation. 
We know the dominance of the opponents of philosophy at his time, for 
whom he also points out that:
A true believer in whatever he apprehends of the truth (al-
Ḥaqq) does not pay attention to the predominant ideas and 
does not care about the objections of the public; for the public 
are inhabitants of their veiled abode, while a true believer is 
a wayfarer from his station toward his God and Prophet, so 
that it is necessitated for the wayfarer to disagree with the 
inhabitant of this abode. (Shīrāzī, 2005, p. 617) 
Such an expression shows how Ṣadrā’s method and understanding of the 
interpretation of hadith differs from the predominant and oficial reading 
of his time. His rival in this regard was ‘Allāmah Majlisī (d.1110/1698) 
who in his commentary on hadith (Majlisī, 1984, p. 27) clearly attacks 
the philosophical and intellectual interpretation of Scripture and hadith 
and suggests that philosophers are straying. We shall return to Majlisī 
later in this section. In his introduction, Ṣadrā explains that hadiths, like 
the Qur’an, possess polysemic levels of meaning of both a horizontal and 
vertical nature.5
Thus, a more sophisticated and in-depth interpretation is in fact 
Ṣadrā’s preferred practice based on his background in philosophy and 
in theoretical and practical Suism. It should be noticed that in his other 
works such as al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah (Transcendent Philosophy), he narrates 
some of his mystical experiences along with his argumentation to 
emphasise the equality of revelation, reason, and mystical visions. In other 
words, he indicates that extracting the in-depth meaning of hadith and 
revelation needs a scholar not only well versed in the Islamic transmitted 
knowledge, but also masterly skilled in the intellectual sciences and in 
practical Suism. 
Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies   Spring 2017 . Vol. X .  No. 2
163 
Ṣadrā and the ʿaql: 
The irst hadith of the opening chapter of al-Kāfī, a narration of creation 
and God’s praise of ʿaql, has been said to be “the most inluential yet 
controversial report in Islamic tradition” (Crow 1996). It is as follows: 
When God had created al-ʿaql, He interrogated it. Then God 
said to it: Come Forward! So he drew near; then God said to 
it, turn back! So it did. Then God said, “By My Power and My 
Glory! I created no creature more loved by me than thee, and 
I did not make thee complete save in one whom I love. Truly, 
thee alone do I bid and thee alone do I forbid, thee alone do I 
punish and thee alone do I reward 6 (Kulaynī, 1379 AH. Solar, 
p. 15).
Ṣadrā’s commentary on the narration begins with his discussion of the 
ontology, cosmology and cosmogony of ʿaql. In fact, among the various 
meanings of ʿ aql in the Islamic context, he intentionally chooses the ones 
that contain cosmological and ontological meaning. So, in the beginning 
of his commentary on the irst hadith he directly speaks of the ʿaql and 
asserts that:
…this ‘aql is the First of Created Beings, and the closest of 
Beings to the First Reality, and the greatest and most perfect of 
them. It is the second of Existent-Beings with respect to ‘being-
ness,’ even though the irst, Exalted be He, has no second in 
His reality because His Oneness is not something enumerated 
as a category of units (Shīrāzī, 1366 A.H. Solar, p. 216).
In Islamic intellectual tradition, the advocates of peripatetic philosophy 
shared this notion with Ṣadrā, namely that the irst created being is the 
ʿaql. It is apparently what Suhrawardī and the followers of the philosophy 
of illumination call the First Light (al-Nūr al-Awwal). Among Muslim 
mystics the same notion is referred to as Divine effusion which is in part 
taken from the Neo-Platonist school and represented irst in al-Fārābī’s 
works and later, in a more profound way, in the school of Ibn Arabī 
(Netton, 1989).
In his commentary Ṣadrā brings in other narrations as witnesses 
to his claim that the ‘aql, in addition to the claims of philosophical 
cosmology, is the irst created being in the religious context. For 
instance, he uses narrations such as “The irst thing that God created 
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is ‘intellect’ (al-‘aql)” as well as other narrations describing the irst 
created being as Muhammadan Light (Nūrī) or Spirit (Rūḥī) and some of 
them regarding it as Pen (al-Qalam) or Cherub-Angel (Malakun Karrubī) 
(Shīrāzī, 1366 A.H. Solar, p. 217). According to Ṣadrā all these names refer 
to a single reality in its various functions. Different characteristics explain 
the different names: ʿ aql accordingly is not corporeal, it is essentially one, 
its quiddity and reality is an independent substance with no connection 
to physical bodies, its being is not like accidents, nor does its conduct 
resemble souls. It has no parts, nor is it mixed like forms and materials 
(Shīrāzī, 2005, p. 575).  Each of these qualities is therefore indicated by a 
distinct name. 
Ṣadrā’s commentary seems to reconcile philosophical and religious 
concepts in a cosmological framework. In the above-mentioned 
narrations, the irst created being is the irst emanation from the First 
Reality (al-Ḥaqq al-Awwal), the creation of which is immediate. These 
narrations indicate that God created the First Intellect as an immediate 
creature. Thus, in order to act, the intellect is not in need of any physical 
or spiritual body. A being with this character in the Islamic intellectual 
tradition is called an immaterial substance. Based on the narrations 
quoted by Ṣadrā, the immaterial intellect can be expressed in different 
ways: Pure Immaterial Substance, Light, Pen, and Spirit. 
With his mystical-philosophical background, Ṣadrā tries to 
comment on hadith by employing terms that he uses in his transcendent 
philosophy. For instance, he refers to the philosophical notion of the 
Principle of the Noblest Contingency (imkān al-ashraf) which asserts that 
nothing can exist without a cause originating at a higher ontological 
level (Marcotte 2012). He explains the principle of homogeneity between 
cause and effect (al-Sinkhiyyatu bayn al-ʿallati wa al-maʿlul). And by the 
principle of the Unique One (al-Waḥid), he argues for the existence and 
necessity of the First intellect. All other intellects that have polarisations 
of being with the irst intellect exist hierarchically below the irst intellect. 
In four out of thirty-four hadiths of the irst chapter of the Kitāb 
al-ʿaql wa al-Jahl (The Book of Intellect and Ignorance) Ṣadrā reinterprets the 
term ʿaql as “the immaterial substance.”
Following hadith number thirty-two, he asserts that:
The ʿ aql has different degrees and the one that is the most perfect 
is the irst created-being, and the closest of “Independent-
Beings.” It is the most obedient to God with no disobedience. 
But the latter intellects, that are descending to human bodies, 
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because of mixture and combination and attaching to the 
bodily desires, are capable of disobedience, based on the 
strengths or weakness of the power of Intellect and spiritual 
insight (Shīrāzī, 2005, p. 567). 
Thus, Ṣadrā declares that the descended intellects are of the same genus as 
the irst intellect and in fact they are descended degrees thereof. Descended 
intellects are a combination of intellectual substance, passions and 
corporeality, and therefore they are not strictly obedient to the Divine as 
the irst intellect is. Their combined being makes it possible for them to 
be capable of both obedience and disobedience to the Divine command. 
As mentioned in the irst hadith of the book of intellect and 
ignorance in al-Kāfī, God commands the ʿaql with two orders: Come 
forward (aqbil) and go back (adbir). Therefore, according to Ṣadrā the 
mystery of the fall and ascension is in obedience to the order of “Come 
forward and go back”. He describes this function as following: 
In the process of the fall, at irst it was ʿaql, then it became 
soul; after that nature and form and lastly corporeal being. 
In ascension toward God it is irst corporeal being, then it 
becomes one form after another form and then soul after 
another soul and inally intellect following another intellect. 
Namely, irst it was simple potential intellect, then primary 
intellect, later habitual intellect, then passive intellect within 
which the ʿaql moves from one form to another, and after that 
it becomes the acquired intellect, then actual intellect that 
unites with all or most of the intelligible forms. Finally, the 
ʿaql becomes the active intellect where it returns to the original 
form from which it had descended. So, the inal stage of the 
ascending arc is the beginning of the descending arc (Shīrāzī, 
2005, p. 567). 
 
What is mentioned above shows that, according to Ṣadrā’s ontological 
and cosmological scheme, the ʿaql that descends to the corporeal 
human stage is the lowest degree of the First Intellect. Nevertheless, this 
intellect—which is in the lowest degree—by ascending back through the 
levels is able to reach its highest position which is the ultimate goal of 
the journey of the ʿaql. The return to the origin of ʿaql means uniication 
with the irst intellect and a positive response to the Divine command 
of “Come forward” (aqbil). This is the uppermost stage of the ʿaql’s 
ascending journey. 
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It is important to note that the beginning of the ascending journey, 
in Islamic intellectual tradition generally and especially according to 
Ṣadrā, is the state of awareness. Wakefulness and self-knowledge are the 
primary steps to being aware of the process of ascent, otherwise there 
would not be any movement. Moreover, in the traditional, broad-based 
Islamic view of things, one cannot disengage the study of the soul from 
cosmology (Chittick, 2007, pp. 40-50) Therefore the human being’s 
end is not separated from the ʿaql’s end. Moreover, the ascending and 
descending journey of the ʿaql connects the visible world with the 
invisible one. Ṣadrā asserts that: 
    
[The Intellect’s] orientation toward God—after its descent 
to the visible world and encountering the shortcomings and 
darkness of corporeality and in addition to the depth of 
ignorance and arrogance there—is because of its awareness 
about the ignorance that is the nature of the physical world and 
its understanding of the existence of another world and return 
to its origin through perfecting the self by gaining knowledge 
and spiritual states and keeping distance from the obscenities 
and religious prohibitions. [The Intellect’s orientation toward 
its origin also takes place] by releasing from the veils and its 
ascension to the higher stations and taking other forms [one 
after another] and its existence to a higher level of being and 
stage after another stage which is the opposite of the descendent 
arc (Shīrāzī, 2005, p. 330).
The Ontological and Cosmological state of Muhammadan 
Spirit:   
The irst hadith of the Kitāb al-ʿaqlwa al-Jahl indicates that ʿaql is loved 
by God more than anything else. Ṣadrā explains that the First Intellect is 
the most venerable being among the creatures and therefore it attracts the 
highest level of Divine Love. 
Ṣadrā depicts role of ʿaql in the circle of existence with the two 
movements of descent and ascent. As mentioned, he also reminds the 
reader of the vital role of awareness in this movement, for if there were no 
awareness there would be no movement and no perfection in the arc of 
ascent. Therefore, awakening people and reminding them of their reality 
and higher degrees of being, the origin and return, is the duty of the 
prophet or the sage who has already been awakened to his reality, light or 
Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies   Spring 2017 . Vol. X .  No. 2
167 
spirit is pure intellect. This might be the reason why Ṣadrā identiies the 
ʿaql in the irst hadith with the Muhammadan Spirit, for God addresses 
the ʿaql thus: “I did not make you complete, save in one whom I love.” 
Ṣadrā elaborates: 
His light was with all Prophets inwardly and with Him 
[Muhammad] outwardly. It is narrated from Him that: We are 
the last and the foremost, i.e. last in exit and emergence like 
the fruits, and irst in creatures and being like seeds. So, He 
is seed of the tree of the world. Then God asked Him: Turn 
back! That means turn to your Lord, so he turned from the 
world and returned to his Lord in the night of the Ascension 
and when his spirit separated from this world. Then God said: 
By my glory and majesty I did not create any creation dearer 
than you to me. This was His state (peace be upon him), for he 
was beloved of God and the most loved among the creatures 
(Shīrāzī, 2005, p. 218).
Thus, the nearest creature to God, the Muhammadan Spirit which existed 
inwardly with all prophets, is called ʿaql in the irst hadith, and therefore 
it pertains to God’s love. This helps to explain why asserting the message 
and mission of earlier authentic prophets is one of the Islamic creeds. 
In fact, witnessing the mission of all the prophets is equal to witnessing 
Muhammad’s mission and contrariwise. Another hadith in al-Kāfī states 
that: “God created al-ʿaql and it is the irst creature God created among 
the spiritual beings on the right side of the Throne from His light.” 
This hadith indicates that intellect is the irst entiication and the irst 
descending light from al-Haqq al-Awwal, and its creation is directly 
attributed to the name of Allah, that is the greatest of Divine Names. 
Consequently, manifestation of the Real in mirror of the irst intellect is 
a manifestation with complete dignity and contains all unveiling. 
Ontologically and cosmologically the First Intellect gives awareness 
to existence and this scheme of the universe is not an accident; rather 
consciousness is the vital pillar of being. Therefore, according to a 
prophetic narration, if a man dies without having awakened, he dies the 
death of al-Jāhilīyyah (Ignorance). Prophet described the state of such a 
human is as sleeping from which he will awaken when he dies.   
The superiority of ʿaql in both the scheme of ascent and descent 
is the key element for understanding the unique role of the intellect in 
Ṣadrā’s ontology and cosmology and uncovering the mystery of why 
God is said in this hadith to ind it so worthy. We mentioned that the 
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uniication of the First Intellect with the Muhammadan Spirit compels 
Ṣadrā to interpret the Divine command as the spiritual state of the 
Prophet. Moreover, Ṣadrā states that the knowledge of God and His 
reward and punishment is dependent on one’s knowledge of Muhammad 
and on following him. A Qur’anic instance for this is the verse in which 
God commands:  
Say: If you do love God, follow me: God will love you and 
forgive you your sins: for God is oft-forgiving, most merciful” 
(Qur’an, 3: 31), or: “Say ‘Obey God and His messenger’, but if 
they turn back, God loves not those who reject faith (Qur’an, 
3: 32). 
Examining Ṣadrā’s Approach: 
There is nothing in existence other than ʿaql to deine itself. The irst 
chapter of Uṣūl al-Kāfī has been a good source for those interested in 
deining ʿaql and its functions, and there have been many commentaries 
or annotations on that collection. Each scholar commenting on the 
narrations on aql has interpreted them and this, it may be worth noting, 
is the central paradox of all exegesis of authoritative texts: the reading 
is only as good as the fallible reader. Earlier in this work a number of 
commentaries on Uṣūl al-Kāfī were mentioned. In this section we will 
review and examine some of the most important critics of Ṣadrā’s 
understanding of the irst narration of the opening chapter of Uṣūl al-
Kāfī. 
Criticism of Ṣadrā:
In the history of early modern Shi‘a thought, Majlisī (d. 1698) played 
an important role in making a collection of all extant hadith and 
treatises related to Shia belief in one way or another. His voluminous 
Bihār al-anwār (Oceans of the Lights) in 110 volumes in the modern 
edition contains a categorised collection of narrations although without 
considering their authenticity. Majlisī is known for his criticism of 
Sui and philosophical interpretations of revelation and hadith. In his 
Risālah al-Iʿtiqādat (Treatise on the Creeds), Majlisī states that the ʿaql in 
the hadith refers to the Prophet.  He, therefore, concludes that following 
Muhammad’s tradition—an expectation of every pious Muslim—is the 
same as following the intellect. Here is the point that he makes: following 
Muhammad is not like following one’s own reason or “the lost Greek 
philosophers.” (Majlisī, 2002, p. 28) He clearly differentiates between 
logical reasoning and following the Prophet. 
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The irst choice is not promising. The second is what every believer 
commanded to do. This is the distinction between him and philosophers 
who maintain that a sound intellect does not judge in opposition to 
the prophetic orders. He then reports on an unfortunate fact that 
some scholars of his own time are following Greek philosophy in the 
interpretation of the revelation. He describes these people as follows:
…neither believe a prophet nor have faith in a Book. They 
have relied on their own corrupted reasons and baseless 
thoughts and have chosen philosophers as their own leaders. 
They interpret and justify the clear sayings of the Imams which 
conlict with the sayings of philosophers. It is while that they 
all know that all their reasons and doubts are false. And, they 
see how many contradictory and heterogeneous thoughts exist 
among them. (Majlisī, 2002, p. 28) 
Ṣadrā is among those who Majlisī is addressing. Each scholar has 
commented differently on the hadith and the meaning of `aql. 
According to Majlisī, ʿaql is the faculty of understanding good and evil, 
distinguishing between right and wrong, and therefore its domain is that 
of responsibility, reward and punishment (Majlisī, 1983, p. 99). On the 
other hand, as mentioned, he denies the reliability of ʿaql in interpreting 
Scripture. To prevent errors made by ʿaql, the accepted intellection is the 
one that is in accordance with Divine law. (Majlisī, 1983) He stresses that 
any trust in ʿaql without referring to Divine law is corrupted and leads 
astray. 
To examine Majlisī’s criticism of Ṣadrā’s methodology, one should 
refer to Allama Majlisī’s Mirʾāt al-ʿuqūl (The Mirror of Intellects), a twenty-
six volume commentary on hadith in which he states that: 
To maintain what philosophers tend and pretend to prove of 
an immaterial eternal substance that essentially and practically 
has no attachment to corporeal, requires denial of many 
principles of the religion such as the contingency of the world 
and likewise (Majlisi, 1410AH, p. 27). 
Majlisī directly attacks philosophical and intellectual interpretations of 
hadith and Divine revelation for their implicit denial of many principles 
of the religion. Ṣadrā, in contrast to Majlisī, in his prologue to Sharḥ Uṣūl 
al-Kāfī alludes to the point that hadith, like the Qur`ān, has multiple 
layers of meaning. It is therefore necessary to reach the depth of its 
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meaning through intellectual contemplation and reasoning and deepen 
our knowledge about it as time passes and new generations and thinkers 
come to existence. Moreover, in regard to the Qur’anic interpretation, he 
states that: 
Some have thought that true knowledge is restricted only 
to jurisprudence and outward commentary and theology 
(kalām), and there is no knowledge except them. This is 
a very erroneous idea and such people do not seem to have 
understood the meaning of the holy Qur’an as yet and do not 
believe that it is as endless ocean, encompassing all the truth; 
for all the connotations of the holy Qur’an have not been 
mentioned in the kind of commentary attributed to Qushayrī, 
Thaʿlabi, Wāḥidī, Zamakhsharī and the like, and their method 
is to deny what they cannot understand. And their followers 
and imitators have never drunken the pure wine of the truth 
(Ṣadrā, 1363 A.H.). 
Followers of both Majlisī and Ṣadrā have continued to debate the same 
problem up to the present time. 7  
Ibn Taymīyya’s and the Question of ʿaql
Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328 AD) is known for his literalist reading of 
Scripture and the prophetic tradition. However, he is not known as a 
hadith authority in the history of Islamic sciences. Nonetheless, in a 
response to an inquiry, he questiones the authenticity of the hadith, 
“the irst thing God created was intellect.” He emphasises that it is a 
fabricated (Kidhb) hadith and is not narrated among the authentic 
hadith collections. He then adds that people like Dāwūd ibn Muḥabbar 
and others who wrote about the intellect have commented on the hadith, 
including philosophically minded groups like al-Ikhwān al-Ṣafā (The 
Brethren of Purity) in addition to al-Ghazzālī in some of his works, along 
with Ibn `Arabī, Ibn Sab`īn, and others. Having said that, he reminds 
the reader that scholars of hadith such as Abū Ḥātam al-Rāzī, Ibn al-
Jawzī among the others hold that the hadith is a lie and its narration 
is an accusation to the messenger of God (Ibn Taymīyah, 1966, p. 191). 
Ibn Taymīyya states that the true reading of it is “when God created 
the intellect” not “the irst thing God created”. He continues that the 
real meaning of the hadith is that God had interrogated ʿaql in the irst 
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moments of its creation, but that this does not imply that it is the irst 
created being. He takes the opportunity to attack both philosophers and 
Shi’a scholars by stating that philosophers (the followers of Aristotle) 
and those Esoteric (Baṭinī) Shi‘ite who follow them, along with suis and 
mutikallimūn (theologians) believe in the eternity of the world, therefore, 
they narrate the hadith as “the irst thing that God created.”  He claims 
that the reason for this is that they use this hadith as a proof-text for 
their belief in eternity. (Ibn Taymīyah, 1966, p. 192) It is not clear how 
Ibn Taymīyya makes the connection between “the eternity of the world” 
and creation of ʿaql and consequently calls it a foundation on which to 
prove the authenticity of faith. One of his major differences with Ṣadrā’s 
reading of ʿaql is that he asserts that ʿaql is an accident (ʿAradh), and 
does not subsist through its own essence (Qāʿim bi al-Ghayr). He also 
names it as an innate disposition (Gharīza) or knowledge, or acting based 
on one’s knowledge. What Ibn Taymīyah is trying to establish here is 
that it is not in accordance to the Islamic teachings to describe ʿaql as 
subsisting through its own essence. Consequently, it is impossible for the 
irst created being to be an accident that does not subsist through its own 
essence (p.191). It is obvious that we are faced with two opposing attitudes 
in the Islamic tradition toward the reality of ʿaql.
It seems that despite what Ṣadrā suggests, Ibn Taymiyya does 
not believe in the idea that consciousness is an essential and primary 
foundation of being and creation as it is the case generally in 
the Abrahamic religions. Moreover, it appears that he rejects the 
compatibility of the intellect and revelation because according to his 
deinition intellect is an accident and innate deposition, not a reality at 
the cosmological and ontological level. When Ibn Taymiyya considers 
intellectual disagreements among individuals, he concludes that there is 
disagreement between intellect and revelation. It should be noticed that 
when Ṣadrā speaks about the compatibility and agreement between ʿaql 
and revelation, he refers to ʿaql in its objective existence (Nafs al-Amr), 
not the rational faculty of an individual which is not yet elevated and 
connected to the First Intellect. In that case, the reality of intellect is not 
separated or opposed to the reality of revelation. 
Goldziher and Neoplatonic and Gnostic Elements in Hadith: 
In his article Neuplatonische und gnostische elemente im Hadit (Neoplatonic 
and Gnostic Elements in Hadith) (1908, pp. 317-344), Goldziher (d. 1921) 
claims that there are Neo-Platonic elements such as the First Intellect that 
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have entered into the Islamic hadith corpus. He states that the original 
reading of the hadith in the irst and second century after the appearance 
of Islam (7th & 8th centuries CE) was in the form of “when God created,” 
and in the third and fourth century it changed to “The irst thing God 
created.” In later centuries, according to this claim, Greek philosophy and 
elements of Neoplatonism entered into Muslim intellectual tradition. 
That was the reason for some to try to read the hadith as Awwala mā 
Khalaq (“the irst thing God created”). Although this claim is not 
directly critical of Ṣadrā’s commentary, in a sense it implies that Ṣadrā’s 
approach in commenting on the narration of ʿaql has been inluenced 
by Neoplatonism. An analytical and scholarly response to this claim is 
found in K. Crow’s doctoral thesis in which he clariies that the narration 
Goldziher refers to must be read differently in its original form. Crow 
alludes to another reason to explain why Goldziher states such theory: 
‘Ibn Taymiyya’s treatment of the Agbil report(s) has remained 
inluential among Sunni Muslims until today. Goldziher 
may well have been prompted by this long Sunni tradition of 
distrust towards ‘foreign’ Hellenistic inspiration imputed to 
this ‘aql report, when he placed the “awwalu” version prior to 
the “lammā” form. He did so within a context of a German 
scholarly tradition greatly inluenced by classicism and neo-
Hegelianism, and which inclined to various syncretistic 
hypotheses marked by an over-emphasis on Hellenisation in 
explaining the higher development of Semitic religion (Crow, 
1996, 142). 
Goldziher’s analysis posits that there are no innate philosophical or 
intellectual notions in the Islamic teachings and that any philosophical 
notions found there must be imported from the Greek tradition. Ṣadrā and 
many other great masters of Islamic intellectual tradition, are proof of the 
opposite notion. Their contemplation on revelation and its intellectual 
tradition makes it clear that revelation, for them, is multilayered. Thus, 
they have referred to many Qur’anic verses and hadith. Moreover, as S. 
H. Nasr argues, there has been a “subtle change” (Nasr, 1996, 27-39) in 
the notion of intellect from the Greek philosophical nous to the Islamic 
Peripatetic and Transcendent ʿaql. In fact, Ṣadrā presents the Islamic 
version of “universal cosmology” that “inds one of its most perfect 
expressions in Neoplatonism” (Chittick, 2012, p. 101).  Therefore, having 
explained Ibn Taymīyya’s standpoint on this discussion one can conclude 
that Goldziher is doing nothing but repeating him (i.e. Ibn Taymīyya).  
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Crow’s view on the hadith as a response to Qadarīs
Karim D. Crow,8 calls Ṣadrā’s commentary “the mystical-philosophical 
commentary” and “a profound example of how the Safavid era thinkers 
re-appropriated early Shī’ī hadith” (Crow, 2005, p. 571). Crow nevertheless 
challenges Ṣadrā’s interpretation of intellect as the irst created being. 
This might be due to Crow’s historical view of the hadith of ʿaql which 
probably convinced him that this narration is a response to the Qadarīs 
of the third/ninth century (Crow, 2005). In a dialogue about the irst 
hadith of the opening chapter, Crow responded to the present author 
that the ʿaql mentioned in the hadith has nothing to do with the First 
Intellect:  
It has nothing to do with the irst intellect in the cosmic 
scheme. How do you explain the facing forward and the 
turning back, from the point of view of Neo-platonic scheme? 
It does not it. This is in fact an utterly indigestive in Islamic 
context. [It is] dealing with the main theological issue of the 
time, the issue of whether one’s acts effects his/her salvation? 
To his/her own ability and will? And what is the role of God’s 
will or his foreknowledge in all of this? 
Crow’s historical study of the hadith leads him to conclude that 
Kulaynī’s concerns were to respond to a theological problem of his own 
time on human destiny and the role of one’s actions in it. Based on what 
we mentioned about Ṣadrā’s approach toward commenting Qur’an and 
hadith, he principally held an ahistorical outlook and in this case as an 
essence in his cosmic scheme and not an accident. On the other hand, 
his note on the discussion being “utterly indigestive in Islamic context” 
causes one to ask to which Islamic context and to which interpretation 
of Islam does he refer? If it is Shi’a Islam, then similar ideas such as the 
creation of the illuminated bodies of Imams and the prophet prior to 
their material bodies or their surrounding God’s throne has already been 
accepted and narrated in a large body of Shi’a literature. As Ṣadrā stated 
in his prologue to the commentary, the reason rests in his endeavour 
to comprehend the core meaning of the text, i.e. the inward meaning. 
Finally, it worth reading Ṣadrā’s own words in providing reasons for 
his commentary, “Today we face to a group of people that an in-depth 
contemplation of theological issues are considered by them as heresy, 
and thinking of God’s signs as misleading” (Sadra, 1383 A.H). He is, 
therefore ighting religious dogmatism. 
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Muntaẓerī and the First Intellect in Ṣadrā’s Commentary
Muntaẓerī (1922-2009) was a Shi‘a theologian who thought Usūl al-Kāfī 
in the Qom seminary.9 He did not challenge the philosophical and 
intellectual interpretation of hadith and revelation, but he also rejects 
Ṣadrā’s interpretation of ʿaql as expressed in the margins of the irst 
hadith as the First Intellect. Part of the reason for this, argues Muntaẓerī, 
is that the world of intellect is essentially immaterial even in its activity. 
This means that it comprehend universals with no need for any agent. 
The immaterial intellect, therefore, belongs to the world of Divine 
Command (ʿalām al-amr), not to the world of creation (ʿalām al-khalq). 
The First Intellect is in the arc of descent and the human intellect that 
reaches its perfection, by change and motion, belongs to the arc of ascent. 
Therefore, the perfection of the human intellect is attainable by means of 
obedience to God and ascending. So the ʿaql in the irst narration does 
not refer to the irst intellect. 
Muntaẓerī is not refuting the cosmology and ontology of intellect 
that is described by Ṣadrā in his commentary. He is rather arguing that 
perhaps the irst hadith is not advocating this meaning. There are other 
traditions that present the notion of a First created being. An instance for 
this could be Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq’s (702 -765) narration in which he mentions 
ʿaql as “the irst creature God created among the spiritual immaterial 
beings on the right side of the throne from his light” (al-Kulayni 1422AH, 
400).
Conclusion: An Islamic Version of Cosmology and Ontology 
Ṣadrā’s commentary reveals a metaphysical relection upon the creation 
of the intellect as the irst existentiation/emanation from God. This then 
sets the stage for his detailed explanation, in both philosophical and 
religious language, of the close connection between the intellect and the 
way God brings about the cosmic order. Ṣadrā also ties his theory of 
the intellect to several other key philosophical and religious teachings 
pertaining to the nature of the cosmos and the function of the Prophet 
“Muhammadan Reality” in the divine plan as well as the importance of 
the intellect in relation to religion. The book of intellect and ignorance, 
as mentioned above, holds thirty-four narrations on the concept of 
intellect. In Ṣadrā’s cosmology ʿaql and ontology have a gradational 
nature which includes all of their functions, from the irst intellect to 
the Essential-Substance faculties or aptitudes, the speculative faculty, and 
the practical faculty.10 
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We saw that according to different scholars the intellect mentioned 
in the irst hadith is not the philosophical irst intellect or the irst created 
being. But the question is why Ṣadrā discusses the cosmic intellect when 
commenting this hadith. It should be noticed that Ṣadrā’s commentary 
does not only interpret the irst hadith. Rather it is an inclusive 
commentary that tries to collectively interpret a number of traditions 
and ind out the different meanings and functions of the intellect. He 
inally wants to explain his vision based on the narrations which refer to 
ʿaql, as Muhammadan Light, pen, Cherub-Angel (Malakun Karrubī), or 
as the irst created being. Ṣadrā emphasises that all these names are inally 
referring to a single reality. Whether philosophically or religiously, ʿaql 
plays a vital role in Ṣadrā’s scheme of cosmology and ontology. It is the 
origin and return of the ascending and descending arc in the circle of 
existence. Ṣadrā, moreover, has adapted the notion of the irst intellect 
to the Muḥammadan Reality (al-Haqīqat al-Muḥammadīya) and to prove 
this, he applies both intellectual arguments and revelation. 
Literalists opposing philosophers and Suis have always rejected 
applying philosophical notions to interpret religious texts. In response 
to this claim, in his prologue to Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Ṣadrā reminds 
his readers that hadith, like the Qur’an, have both inward and outward 
meanings and those who only possess knowledge of the outward are 
not capable of reaching the core meaning. Not only does he apply 
philosophical arguments in his commentary, but also esoteric exegesis. 
To conclude on Ṣadrā’s view on ʿ aql, it becomes clear that the notion 
of ʿaql that is proposed in the narrations—including the First Intellect, 
in-born intellect, applied intellect, speculation, theoretical or practical 
intellect—are all gradations of one reality that according to different 
states, degrees or levels have certain attributes and characteristics and 
that each term is a manifestation of the ʿaql in one of those levels. Each 
station of ʿaql has speciic rules and instances. Ṣadrā uncovers those rules 
from narrations of the book of intellect and ignorance. Some narrations 
show the cosmological and ontological reality of ʿaql which, therefore, 
are expressing those attributes, and other narrations represent it as a 
human faculty, and thereby propose the attributes related to a speciic 
station. In a sense, the relation between the irst intellect and the faculty 
of thinking in individuals in the Islamic intellectual tradition is like the 
example of the sun and the moon. Without sunshine, the moon will 
remain in darkness.   
In Ṣadrā’s scheme of the ʿaql, it is important to see how he uniies 
ʿaql with Muḥammadan Reality. This is the key point for offering an 
Islamic version of the cosmology and ontology of the First Intellect. 
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This is also where his cosmology differs from that of Peripatetics such as 
Ibn Sīnā. Ibn Sīnā’s irst created being is merely the irst intellect, while 
Ṣadrā, using his methodology of philosophical and Sui theology, is able 
to expand the notion and uncover its other dimensions. This uniication 
therefore means that grasping the reality of ʿaql and its rules—in the 
sense that Ṣadrā depicts it—is equal to grasping the reality of revelation 
for they originate from one point. 
In Ṣadrā’s ontological and cosmological scheme, ʿaql and revelation 
are manifestations of one and the same reality and therefore they 
cannot contradict each other, hence he applies philosophical arguments 
regarding religious interpretation. The goal of his philosophy is not 
separate from the goal of his religious beliefs, rather through both he 
is seeking perfection, knowledge of the Real, and eternal salvation.  In 
Ṣadrā’s cosmology, there is harmony in the universe and one needs to 
intellectually contemplate and purify one’s soul to reach the inward 
and unseen to grasp it. There is a narration in which Imam al-Kādhim 
(d.799) indicates that God has two guides for man, one is the external 
which is the Prophet and the other one is ʿaql which is the inner (al-
Kulayni 1422AH, 64). Accordingly, Ṣadrā describes the one who rejects 
intellectual contemplation in revelation as the one who has lost his sights 
while believing that the sunshine will guide him. Ṣadrā’s commentary 
on Uṣūl al-Kāi is neither a work of an akhbārī nor an uṣūlī jurist, nor of 
a polemical theologian. Rather, it is the investigation of a philosopher 
who has made a methodology out of philosophy, Suism, and theology 
to offer a transcendent philosophical view of existence and revelation.  
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2   Uṣūl al-Kāfī includes eight chapters as follows: 
The book of Intellect and Ignorance, (al-‘aql wa l-jahl) with 34 narrations; The book 
of priority of knowledge, (Kitāb Faḍl al-`ilm) with 176 narrations; The book of Divine 
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The book of social relations, (Kitāb al-muʿāsharah) with 464 narrations.
3   Mir Dāmād wrote another work known as al-Taʿlīqa ʿalā al-Kāfī, that includes his 
commentary mainly on the three chapters of Intellect and ignorance (al-‘aql wa l-jahl), 
priority of knowledge (Kitāb Faḍl al-ʿilm)  and Divine Unity. He also commented on 
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4   In the Followings Some of them are listed:  
1.   Commentary of Muhammad Ali ibn Muhammad al-Balāghī al-Najafī (d.1592).
2.   Commentary of Mirza Rafīʿa (d.1627). He was Majlisī’s Master.
3.   Commentary of Mulla Mohammad Amin ibn Muhammad Sharif al-Istarābādī 
(d. 1627).
4.   Annotation to the book of al-Rudah min al-Kāfī by Mulla Muhammad Ḥossein 
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5.   Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzi (d. 1640), known as Mulla Ṣadrā, his scholarly work offers a 
detailed exposition of the irst two chapter of al-Uṣūl al-Kāfī. 
6.   Commentary of some of Shi‘a scholars (anonymous), written in 1647.
7.   The scholarly comments of Mulla Ṣālih al-Māzandarānī (d.1671). This is a 
commentary on al-Usūl and al-Rawzah of al-Kāfī. Author in his work irst examines 
chains (isnād) of the hadiths then he discusses the important terms. 
8.   Commentary of Amir Ismail al-Khātūn Abādī (d. 1701). He was an Akhbārī and 
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9.   Commentary of Mīrzā Muhammad Bāqir ibn Muhammad Ibrāhīm al-Hamadānī 
(d. 1804).
10.   Commentary of Mulla Hossein al-Sajasī al-Zanjānī (d.1903). He relied on Ṣadrā’s 
commentary in most of his work and has worked on three irst chapters of Uṣūl al-Kāfī.
11.   Commentary of ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Muẓaffar, namely al-Shāfī fī Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Kāfī 
irst published in 1956 in the city of Najaf.
5   Ṣadrā states: “Know my believer brother: the science of hadith is like Qur’an 
that includes an outward (zāhir), an inward (bāṭin), concise (mujmal), clear (mubayyin), 
exegesis (tafsir), spiritual hermeneutics (ta’wīl), irm (muḥkam), allegorical (mutashābih), 
abrogated (nāsikh) and excludes (mansūkh). As one can ind in the Qur’an verses discussing 
knowledge of spiritual unveiling that only people of Allah and people of Qur’an are 
selected to understand that are dificult concepts of knowledge of Tawhid, knowledge of 
Angels, Books, Prophets, the resurrection of bodies and souls […] likewise ḥadīths are 
divided to knowledge of the world and hereafter, knowledge of devotional practice and 
knowledge of unveiling, the understanding of which is devoted to by people of God and 
they are those that God has exalted, referring to them in ‘whosoever possess knowledge of 
the book’ (Qur’an, 13:43), and ‘and those who are irmly grounded in knowledge’ (Qur’an, 
3:7), and God alludes to this knowledge when He says: ‘He grants wisdom to whom he 
pleases; and he to whom wisdom is granted receive indeed a beneit overlowing’ (Qur’an, 
2:269)… and that is the appreciated knowledge in the Book and tradition (Sunnah)” (Ṣadr 
al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 2005, pp. 170-1).  Also, there is a chapter in the 2nd Volume of Uṣūl al-Kāfī, 
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called ‘Chapter on the narrations that indicates their hadiths is utmost dificult’. Based 
on those Narrations only those who God tested their faith can afford and understand it. 
6   The English translation of the original narration by Karim Crew; see Karim D. 
Crow, Ṣadrā Islamic Philosophy Research Institute (S.I.P.R.In). http://www.mullaṢadrā.
org/new_site/english/Paper Bank/Transcendent Philosophy/45-78376 @ Crow.htm.
It appears that Ṣadrā, based on his Shi‘a collection and isnād, takes the authenticity of 
this narration as granted or following the same pattern as the other narrations from the 
prophet of Islam. Although this hadith is narrated in both Shi‘a and Sunni collections, 
there have always been concerns about its authenticity. Crew alludes to the fact that in the 
earliest sources the hadith with this format including “come forward” and “go back” goes 
back to the 3/4th Hijri centuries. According to him, this indicates that the hadith has a 
doubtful isnād.  Majlisī (d.1110/1698), among the other Shi‘a scholars, narrates the hadith 
in his voluminous Biḥār al-Anwār (1:97). He nevertheless asserts that it was not found 
among the authentic hadiths and is taken from Sunni sources. He mentions that Shia 
sources such as he gathered in his al-Samā’ al-ʿĀlam suggest that the irst created being 
was water or air. He, nevertheless, mentions that the ʿaql in the Shia sources is categorized 
as the irst created being among the Spirituals (al-Ruhānīyīn) which makes it possible to 
consider the existence of other beings before it. Although we are not examining the isnād 
problem in this paper, it is worth mentioning that the frequency of its usage in the Shia 
sources made it generally acceptable for them to admit that the irst created being, at least 
at the ontological level, must be an immaterial being. As in some hadith, the light of 
the prophet and Imams are positioned as the irst created being.  Finally, as al-Kāi and 
other Shi‘a hadith collections display, the importance of the ʿaql in the Shi‘a tradition is 
beyond dispute.  
7   For a complete analysis and assessment of Majlisī’s claim, as well as a deep discussion 
on the necessity of intellectual contemplation on the Qur’an and ḥadīth, it is worth 
mentioning ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s annotation to Majlisī’s Biḥār al-anwār (Ḥashiyah bar 
Biḥār al-anwār) and Mirzā Mahdī Iṣfahanī’s Abwāb al-Hudā. ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī (1904–
1981) commented on the 6 volumes of the Biḥār al-anwār in which he criticized Majlisī’s 
view of intellectual interpretation. He states that Majlisī was not able to deeply grasp 
philosophical concepts. Ṭabāṭabā’ī, due to enormous pressure from traditionists and 
devoted followers of Majlisī, had to stop his commentary and the publisher was forced to 
publish the remaining volumes without Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s critical review.  
8   Karim Crow has undertaken a number of scholarly studies on the notion of the ʿaql 
in the pre-Islamic, Islamic and Modern eras. One of his researches analyzes the different 
understandings of ʿaql in Islamic and Modern understandings. Moreover, he illustrates 
some new phrases that are a result of the Modern life-style such as ‘electronic mind.’ 
(al-Mukh al-Electroni).  See his “The Intellect in Islamic Thought: Mind and Heart;” and 
“Reason, Physicalism, and Islam.” 
9   I had access to an audio recording of Muntaẓerī’s lecture in a private collection in 
2013 in Tehran. 
10   Ṣadrā deines six meanings or functions for ʿaql that encompass its different 
functions.
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